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Turkey has been touched deeply by the geostrategic changes introduced into the 
international system by the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. This article will present and analyze Turkish perceptions of its evolving 
security environment in the post-cold war era as it impacts Turkish interests and 
policies, with particular reference to the implications for Turkish security of the 
existing nuclear weapons and potential proliferation in regions and countries that are 
located near its borders [ 1]. The article will describe and analyze the impact of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union on Turkish security perceptions and policies. It will 
review developments and trends in the Balkans and in the Middle East/Persian Gulf 
region as they impinge on Turkish security. Turkish attitudes toward nuclear energy, 
the nuclear option, and proliferation will also be discussed. 
The Disintegration of the Soviet Union 
The Retrenchment of Soviet/Russian Power 
The retrenchment of Soviet/Russian power in its military, political, and ideological 
manifestations was the paramount development that redefined the geopolitical 
environment around Turkey in the early phase of the end of the cold war. Gorbachev's 
"New Thinking" in foreign and security policy and its realization in the Intermediate 
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987), the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) (1990), and the Soviet commitment to unilateral cuts in manpower and heavy 
weaponry had already greatly moderated the Turkish perception of the Soviet threat. The 
subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union eliminated Turkey's common borders with 
Russia for the first time in several centuries. This historic development gave rise to the 
expectation that in the future Turkey would not have to fear direct exposure to the 
political and military power of its colossal northern neighbor, be it under Soviet or 
Russian control. 
This work was originally sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA, and prepared in early summer 1994. The 
author wishes to thank the Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., for allowing her to use portions of 
Occasional Paper 19, sponsored by the Center. 
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That the elimination of common Turkish-Russian borders was of historic importance 
can be seen in the negative lessons of history. The Soviet threat had impelled Turkey's 
post-World War II foreign and security policies of alliance with the West. Paradoxically, 
however, the 1920s and 1930s were years of mutual confidence and friendship. Those 2 
decades appear a positive aberration when one recalls that for the Ottoman Empire (the 
progenitor of modern Turkey), Russian expansionism in the Balkans and around the 
Black Sea and the Caucasus, had been deadly threats to its territorial integrity and internal 
cohesion since the mid-eighteenth century. During its slow but persistent decline, the 
Western powers had stood by the Ottoman Empire ("The Sick Man of Europe," in the 
words of Tsar Nicholas I) in order to keep Moscow from radically altering the world's 
power balance by achieving control over Constantinople and the Mediterranean, then the 
lifeline of other far-flung European empires. 
In broad terms, therefore, the collapse of Communism and the decline of 
Soviet/Russian power in Turkey's immediate neighborhood have relieved it of a major 
source of threat to its sociopolitical order and territorial integrity, both of which had 
forced Turkey to seek membership in the emerging Western alliance at the end of World 
War II. 
The sense of relief at the early signs of the retrenchment of Soviet/Russian power is 
neither absolute nor final, however. It has been and will continue to be subject to Russian 
behavior, both domestic and international. Turkish assessments of the future behavior of 
Russia remain uncertain and highly speculative, largely because the Russian transition is 
not yet completed. The ultimate nature and direction of the new order in the Russian 
Federation and in the outlying lands freed from Soviet/Russian rule remain unresolved. 
Moreover, domestic and regional conflicts and tensions in former Soviet lands have 
replaced the general social and political stability of the Soviet era, warning of possible 
dangers ahead to which Turkey, so close to the Russian Federation and the "near abroad," 
may be especially sensitive for several interrelated reasons to be discussed below. 
Will Democracy or Ultranationalism Triumph? 
First, it is not clear how long it will be before Russia manages to stabilize its domestic 
political system and economy. Prolonged domestic instability may increase the chances 
of a return to dictatorship, especially of an ultranationalistic type. Results of the national 
elections held in Russia on December 12, 1993, seem to have validated Turkish concerns 
by making the far right populist, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, the second most powerful politician in the Russian Duma [2]. 
Domestic developments had in fact raised troubling issues for the future of Russian 
democracy long before the national election results. For example, President Boris 
Yeltsin's ultimate reliance on military power to settle his scores with the hard-line 
parliamentary opposition, which he provoked into amied rebellion in October 1993 by 
closing down the Russian Parliament, already had raised grave questions about the 
commitment of the Russian leadership to democratic rule and about the growing 
entanglement of the Russian military in politics. The military has been rewarded by 
President Yeltsin for its allegiance during the October uprising in a variety of ways. For 
example, the draft military doctrine prepared by the Ministry of Defense was approved by 
the Security Council over its own draft when it met under Yeltsin's chairmanship in the 
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wake of the uprising. Conscription for the Russian armed forces was increased, and some 
of the restrictions on social benefits for the military have been lifted, even if modestly [3]. 
Long-Term Prospects in the Near Abroad 
There is also a broader dimension to any assessment of potential security risks from 
Russia. Given its geographical size, its large, skilled work force and trained brain power, 
its resource abundance, and the Western determination to underwrite the transition to a 
market economy, Russia could achieve a level of development that would permit it to 
recapture its superpower status in the first decades of the twenty-first century. 
Reorganized and modernized, Russian armed forces would then be in a position to help 
implement the foreign policy of a newly invigorated Russian Federation, which could 
possibly want not only to reclaim its superpower status but also the borders of Tsarist 
Russia. 
It is important at this point to be reminded of the impact of the collective memories 
of the Turkish political elite, irrespective of their current ideological differences, in 
understanding the dominant themes in its assessment of how it expects Russia to evolve 
as an international actor in the medium term. Turkish-Russian history was a long stretch 
of seemingly un·ending series of wars, since the time of Peter the Great, for Russian 
expansion into Ottoman lands in the northern Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. 
It is widely recognized that the Turkish straits were regarded by Tsarist statesmen as "the 
'key' to the Russian house which properly belonged in the Russian pocket" [4]. 
The majority view within the political elite sees Russia as inherently driven toward 
empire, and to warm-water ports, as witnessed through history. Many argue that this inner 
thrust toward empire cannot be totally eradicated, or effectively checked, even after 
democratization has been consolidated. Russian attitudes and conduct toward the near 
abroad since early 1993 have provided ample evidence in support of some critical 
elements of this collective image. Following the early euphoria about the retreat of 
Soviet/Russian power, leading Turkish officials and public opinion makers profess that in 
the back of their mind lurks the image of a new Russian empire in the not too distant 
future. Turks will be most relieved if and when Russian behavior in the southern near 
abroad matches the words of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who has often tried to 
convince the West that Russia is not turning back to its imperialistic and nationalistic 
policies of the past [5]. 
Most elite perceptions in Turkey seem to approximate Henry Kissinger's original 
assessments. Writing in mid-1992, Mr. Kissinger expressed concern about the nature and 
direction of Russian power and foreign policy in the near future. Kissinger noted that 
hundreds of thousands of former Red Army troops remained in the territories of the 
former Soviet republics. The troops came and went and maneuvered without asking the 
permission of the newly independent countries. Moreover, he argued, the presence of at 
least 25 million Russians as minorities in those countries could easily provide the pretext 
for Russian intervention in interethnic conflicts. Finally, Kissinger warned that the 
eventual recentralization of the historic Russian empire (involving the reassertion of 
Russian control over the Black Sea and the Caucasus and a drive once again for access to 
the warm waters of the Mediterranean) should not be ruled out [ 6]. 
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In a major speech before the Turkish Grand National Assembly at the beginning of 
the parliamentary year, September 1, 1993, President Suleyman Demirel of Turkey 
expressed concerns almost identical to those of Kissinger. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union has eliminated a big threat but ushered 
in a period full of uncertainties. The world has not achieved stability. It is true 
that Turkey has been freed from a 400-year old threat. On the other hand, 
instability in Russia continues to be of imminent concern to Turkey. The 
Russian Federation claims responsibility over the destiny of 30 million 
Russians living in other republics. Is the Russian Federation uneasy about the 
breakup of the Soviet Empire? Are local conflicts there going to be pretexts 
for the reconstruction of the Empire? To what degree is Russia behind these 
conflicts? 
Clearly, Turkey is disturbed at what it sees as a gradual return by Russia to a spheres-of-
influence policy in the near abroad, a policy that would be grossly incompatible with the 
independence of those countries. The near abroad countries have come to be viewed by 
both the Russian government and the opposition to hold utmost importance for Russian 
foreign policy and security interests. Armed conflicts in Tadjikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
and Moldova have given Russia reasons to seek wider legitimacy for its involvement. In 
February 1993, President Yeltsin appealed to the international community to grant Russia 
the authority to act as the peacekeeper in the former Soviet republics. Eventually it 
assumed that role in various republics rocked by internal conflict (i.e. Georgia), while 
simultaneously insisting that nonmembers of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) could not engage in peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union. 
Russia also began to object to some of the provisions of the CFE Treaty. Throughout 
1993, Russian commentators expressed dissatisfaction with restrictions that the CFE 
Treaty placed on Russian forces in the flanks, more specifically those in the northern 
Caucasus. President Yeltsin sent shock waves through Turkey when, in a letter addressed 
to President Demirel in late September 1993, he declared that force ceilings established 
by the CFE Treaty for northern Caucasus were beginning to fall short of responding to 
Russia's needs, adding that they faced the risk of nonimplementation [7]. Russia also 
notified NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner of its dissatisfaction with the force 
ceilings in the part of Russia that adjoined the troubled region of the Caucasus [8]. 
Russian objections to implementation of the zonal ceilings on the flanks in the CFE 
Treaty have become a test case for the Turkish public of Russian intentions, particularly 
in the southern Caucasus. According to Turkish press reports, Ankara informally notified 
Washington that Turkey would take its own "measures" (meaning the redeployment of 
Turkish forces withdrawn under the CFE Treaty from eastern Anatolia), in the event that 
Yeltsin's new proposals were given a green light. On this question, as on most other 
questions pertaining to European security, the attitude of the United States would be of 
paramount importance. It was a relief for the Turkish public when U.S. Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher stated during the NATO council meeting in Istanbul from June 9 to 
10, 1994, that his country was committed to preservation of the integrity of the CFE 
Treaty [9]. Reiteration of the same position by the council in the final communique, 
therefore, is of particular importance in somewhat helping to allay Turkish concerns. 
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In one of the most skeptical analyses of the post-Soviet role of Russia in the former 
Soviet republics in its south, Turkish Chief of General Staff Dogan Giires articulated 
evolving Turkish perceptions before the Fourth Antalya International Conference on 
Peace and Cooperation (organized by the Turkish Atlantic Council), on October 15, 1993. 
The policy pursued by the Russian Federation which constituted the core of 
the former Soviet Union and which is the leader of the CIS has lately 
displayed disturbing signals. The Russian Federation considers itself 
responsible for the fate of 30 million ethnic Russians living in the rest of the 
former Soviet Republics. · 
Developments in the Caucasus give the impression that Russia has an 
unfavorable attitude toward countries that are not members of the CIS. 
I find it difficult to understand the real meaning behind the initiatives to 
increase the ceilings established by the CFE Treaty, especially when viewed in 
the light of historical facts. 
On the eve of President Demirel's official visit to Ukraine and Moldova from May 30 to 
June 1, 1994, General Giires repeated his grave concerns about potential Russian 
expansionism, especially in areas close to Turkish borders (e.g., southern Caucasus). He 
is reported to have prompted rebuttal in the Russian press [10]. 
In summary, the relative demise of Soviet power and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union have been a mixed blessing from the perspective of Turkey. While the clearly 
defined and colossal Soviet threat has disappeared, the politico-military environment 
vacated by Soviet/Russian rule has become the breeding ground for potential risks and 
threats because of the deep tensions that have gripped this environment. Against the 
background of a power vacuum created by the Soviet collapse, the system of externally 
imposed constraints that had for so long managed to suppress potential local conflicts has 
disappeared, paving the way for violent resurfacing of some old ethnic, national, and 
territorial feuds and disagreements. The local conflicts and tensions have provided the 
Russian Federation the opportunity to assume the role of peacekeeper, and thus to reassert 
its influence in several of the former Soviet republics. 
Turkey's physical proximity to the various theaters of tension and conflict, as well as 
its special ties with some of the parties to those conflicts (i.e., Azerbaijan, caught in a 
fierce and protracted conflict with Armenia which has irredentist claims on Turkey), have 
raised serious questions about the prospects for Turkey's continuing ability to remain 
physically untouched. 
Moreover, developments in the near abroad, in general, and in the southern Caucasus 
republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, in particular, have shown over time that Russia 
would have the willingness and capability to overwhelm buffers if it resolved to do so. In 
the almost 3 years that have elapsed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian 
behavior close to Turkish borders has left Turkey seriously apprehensive about the future 
intentions and behavior of the Russian Federation. 
154 D. Bazoglu Sezer 
Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union 
From another angle as well, the international security environment has changed 
drastically since the collapse of the Soviet Union: The number of independent states in 
possession of nuclear weapons on their territory has automatically increased by three. 
Apart from the Russian Federation, recognized by the West as the sole nuclear weapons 
successor state, three potential nuclear weapons states have surfaced. According to the 
Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements signed in December 1991, Russia was to remain by 
1995 the sole nuclear weapons state in the CIS. In this spirit Ukraine and Belarus 
committed themselves to the transfer of the nuclear weapons on their territory to Russia 
and pledged to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPn as non-nuclear 
weapons states. Kazakhstan refrained for some time from a similar pledge, but in May 
1992, it signed the Lisbon Protocol, a legal supplement to START I whereby Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan assumed the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the 
START I Treaty and promised to join the NPT in the shortest time possible. 
In other words, all three former Soviet republics that inherited nuclear arsenals on 
their soil with the disintegration of the Soviet Union eventually acquiesced to Western 
and Russian pressures to give up these arsenals and denounce future nuclear weapons 
statehood [11]. In the case of Ukraine, this point was reached after much ambiguity, 
diplomatic tension, and difficult bargaining [12]. The evolution of Kazakhstan's position 
also displayed some fluctuation and ambiguity [13], giving rise to apprehension in the 
West about a potential "Islamic bomb." Belarus pursued a straight line in support of its 
original commitment to the principles of the Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements and the 
Lisbon Protocol [14]. 
Among a host of issues raised for international security by the fragmentation of 
political, and therefore physical, control over nuclear weapons in the former Soviet 
Union, several directly bear on Turkish security interests and concerns. The potential of 
these weapons to seriously undercut the international nonproliferation regime and the 
nuclear disarmament momentum between the United States and Russia is the paramount 
threat to international security, and hence to Turkish security. The policy corollary to this 
perception is the suggestion that Western diplomacy should have focused its priorities on 
the actual implementation of negotiated nuclear disarmament agreements, instead of 
getting entangled in and held hostage by the political disputes created by the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. 
Turkish concerns are, first and foremost, preoccupied with the nuclear arsenal of the 
Russian Federation. The Russian nuclear force continues to be formidable despite some 
positive developments, like the ratification of START I and a series of unilateral cutbacks 
and stoppages by Russia. Moreover, the serious shortcomings suffered in maintenance 
and servicing of the weapons, as a result of severe budget constraints, diminish their 
reliability for the Russians. Yet unlike the United States, Russia reportedly continues with 
some significant weapons related activities (i.e. the continued production of tritium and 
plutonium) [15]. An article in Krasnaya Zvezda, which appeared on July 23, 1993, 
indicates that the Russian military closely follows the mood in the United States in favor 
of a universal ban on the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium [16]. 
In principle, Turkish concerns with respect to Russian nuclear weapons focus on 
intentions rather than capability. Turks, like the rest of the world, have learned to view 
these weapons as a fact of life, however awful, so long as they exist. Hence, Turks in 
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general do not anticipate to be threatened by a nuclear attack from the Russian 
Federation, but many consider with trepidation the possibility of nuclear blackmail. The 
Russian nuclear force remains potent enough to allow Russia to pressure and intimidate 
weaker neighbors, especially if it fell into the wrong hands (e.g., Zhirinovsky's), inside 
Russia. 
It is important to note that there is a nuanced assessment of the nature and purposes 
of Russian nuclear weapons. Turkish soft-liners tend to see a functional linkage between 
the purposes of these weapons and the regime in power. The regime in Russia today sits 
on the legacy of a highly rational and cautious Soviet attitude toward nuclear weapons. 
As Russian democracy matures, there should be less reason to expect reliance on nuclear 
weapons as a political tool or for nuclear adventurism. Needless to say, confidence in the 
steady progress of Russian democracy and its benevolent impact on the Russian mind in 
downplaying the significance of nuclear weapons as a political and military instrument, 
reflects the views of those who trust Russian rationality and prudence in nuclear matters, 
even when its foreign policy goals could grow more imperial. 
The hard-liners have less confidence in Russia's ability to rid itself of authoritarian 
and imperial impulses. Even if democratization succeeds, threat of the use of nuclear 
weapons could remain a dangerous possibility in order to support the foreign policy drive 
toward empire. Two recent developments have magnified the apprehensions of the hard-
liners who worry that Russia would not desist from resorting to coercion, even under a 
democratic regime. The first is the approval of a new military doctrine that contains 
several unnerving elements. The most disturbing aspect with respect to nuclear weapons 
is repudiation of the declaratory policy of the Soviet Union of no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons, in favor of first-use for the defense of Russia and its allies [17]. Accordingly, 
"the Russian nuclear umbrella" has now been extended to all the member countries of the 
Collective Security Treaty, guaranteeing their territories against invasion by any country 
that is an ally of any other nuclear power [18]. This posture can easily be viewed as a 
veiled warning to Turkey (which has shown a keen interest in promoting close political 
and economic ties with the former Soviet republics in the southern Caucasus and Central 
Asia) to keep its distance from the near abroad in the south. From a broader perspective, 
the position of the new military doctrine sanctioning first-use of nuclear weapons is seen 
as an instrument at the service of Russia's larger foreign policy objective of deterring 
other regional states from competing with Russia for influence and control in the former 
Soviet Union. 
The second disconcerting development on the question of Russian nuclear weapons 
from the perspective of the Turkish hard-liners concerns the hypothetical implications, for 
a regional state like Turkey, of the U.S.-Russian agreement to cease mutual targeting of 
nuclear weapons [19]. Some Turkish strategic thinkers hypothesize that Turkey may have 
been placed among the post-cold war targets of Russian nuclear weapons now that they 
are reported to have been detargeted from civilian and military centers in the United 
States. This hypothesis, however, apparently does not address the question of whether 
such retargeting would have been technically feasible in such a brief period. In short 
Turkish hard-liners, an important group within the Turkish political elite, regard post-
Soviet nuclear weapons in Russia at best as crude instruments of intimidation and 
blackmail in dealing with the non-nuclear weapons states on its periphery whose behavior 
in the former Soviet Union may have seemed inimical to the interests of Russia. The soft-
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liners, who have more confidence in Russia's peaceful nuclear intentions, argue that 
increased U.S.-Russian nuclear confidence does not necessarily translate to increased 
insecurity for Turkey. 
Despite the gradations in Turks' opinions concerning the purposes behind the 
Russian nuclear arsenal in the post-cold war era and the nature of plausible Russian 
behavior in response to future challenges to its perceived national interests, Turks are 
unanimously weary of the mere existence of this awesome capability, and of having to 
live in the shadow of a foreign power's nuclear arsenal. After all, it is that very capability 
that allows the Russian Federation to retain the distinction of being one of the two 
military superpowers. It is only logical for Turkey, then, to support more nuclear 
disarmament rather than less. The long delay in the ratification, and hence the 
implementation, of START I as a result of the nuclear bargaining among post-Soviet 
states has therefore been a matter of serious security concern to Turkey. There is little 
reason for optimism at this point to expect that, once in force, START II will be followed 
up by START III. Furthermore, neither Turkey nor any other nonnuclear state on Russia's 
periphery (e.g., Poland or possibly a future nonnuclear Ukraine), can ever feel fully at 
peace because unlike Mikhail Gorbachev, who was committed to global denuclearization, 
the Russian military doctrine of October 1994 renounces such a goal indefinitely. 
The Turkish view concerning the threat posed to the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
by the nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union rests on arguments shared by the 
international community, in general, but with special sensitivity to Turkey that is in 
physical proximity to both the former Soviet Union and the Middle East. Like the rest of 
the international community, the Turkish political elite is very much aware that the 
emergence of instant nuclear weapons states, even by inheritance, would pose an 
irreparable blow to the NPT. 
Hence, Turkey appears to have condoned the Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements of 
December 1991, and the Lisbon Protocol of May 1992. Interestingly, however, a small 
minority among the Turkish political elite would have preferred to see Kazakhstan retain 
the nuclear weapons that were on its soil. They argue that Kazakhstan's security situation 
is unique among the former Soviet states because of its ethnic composition and its 
immensely rich natural resources, both of which could offer incentives for Russia to seek 
to compromise Kazakhstan's independence. A possible return of Kazakhstan into the fold 
of the Russian Federation would have a domino effect on the rest of the former Soviet 
Union in Asia. On the other hand, an independent nuclear weapons capability in the 
hands of Kazakhstan would deter a potentially expansionist Russia. This minority opinion 
contends that while a similar potential threat also exists for Ukraine, the West would not 
allow Ukraine's independence to be violated by Russia. If the West failed to guarantee 
Ukrainian independence, however, it would be offering legitimacy to a hypothetical 
nuclear weapons option by Ukraine. It is important to note that a hypothetical 
independent nuclear force for Kazakhstan is not perceived directly in association with the 
security interests of Turkey nor an "Islamic bomb," but as an indirect input into Eurasian 
security due to its anticipated contribution to the enhancement of the independence of 
Kazakhstan and the rest of the newly independent republics in Central Asia. 
Turks' general approval of the recognition of the Russian Federation as the sole 
successor to the former Soviet Union in the sphere of nuclear weapons is based on the 
following considerations: (1) that it would prevent proliferation; (2) that it would ensure 
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the physical safety and security of the weapons and related material as well as that of C3, 
and (3) that it would prevent the leakage of nuclear material and technology that might 
facilitate international nuclear terrorism and unauthorized use. This does not mean, 
however, that Turks are fully confident about the actual state of affairs on these questions. 
Prime Minister Tansu <;iller of Turkey recently articulated Turkish concerns in a broader 
context. 
Surely, we cannot remain aloof to reports suggesting some elements of the 
former Soviet bloc military and its industrial appendages have exercised what 
can only be charitably described as lax control over dangerous materials and 
weapons stocks. These and other manifestations of the proliferation problem 
merit an official NATO strategy that offers a genuine prospect of advancing 
our mastery of this, one of our most serious problems [20]. 
Reports in the international media of the theft of fissile material by Russian organized 
criminals [21], and earlier stories of potential "loose nukes" flooding the illicit arms 
market, have made Turkey sit on edge since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Turkish 
fears have been aggravated by its physical proximity to regions where political and 
socioeconomic dislocation have offered breeding grounds for illegal and illicit activities. 
Further aggravating Turkish fears has been the escalation since the Persian Gulf War of 
the struggle that the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), has been engaged in 
against the unitary Turkish state. Nuclear blackmail by PKK terrorists had not seemed a 
totally implausible scenario during the time between the failed coup in 1991 and mid-
1992, when the whole world suspected Moscow of having lost control over strategic as 
well as tactical nuclear weapons spread over a vast area. 
Can Russia Survive [22]? 
It is true that relations between the federal government and the constituent units that make 
up the Russian Federation have been subject to the pressures of political and economic 
revamping that has swept through the former Soviet Union since Gorbachev came into 
power. While the general desire for greater autonomy from Moscow may be viewed as a 
natural response of the periphery toward the center during times of profound transition 
and the chaos that accompanies it, the depth of rivalry between Moscow and several of 
the 21 ethnic republics as well as lower units appears to go beyond what would be 
considered a routine contest over power sharing in a federal system. The situation in the 
Russian Federation warrants close scrutiny because it involves independence-minded 
secessionist movements. In the words of a public official of Russian ethnicity in 
Bashkortastan, ethnic/national separatism poses the major challenge to the formation of 
Russia, which therefore must be rendered hopeless [23]. Of these, the movements in the 
Volga-Ural region and in the republics ofTatarstan and Chechnya appear to be especially 
forceful. A complicating factor for Moscow with regard to the centrifugal pressures in 
this particular region is the concentration of large numbers of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear weapons facilities [24]. 
Notwithstanding the feverish ethnic nationalist and autonomy projects pursued in 
several non-Russian areas within the Russian Federation, most Turks believe that it will 
survive, by use of force if necessary. The dominant Turkish view comes close to the view 
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expressed by a former member of Y eltsin's government who contended that Moscow may 
have to use force to control unrest in the regions, and that the choice may be between 
disintegration of the Russian Federation and a police state [25]. Autonomy or 
independence movements among Turkic peoples like Tatars and Bashkirs is a delicate 
issue for Turkish-Russian relations because of Moscow's deep-rooted fear of Pan-
Turkism and Turkey's potential power to pose as a sponsor, if not a provocateur, of such 
movements. Aware of Moscow's somewhat irrational fear of a potential Turkish role in 
Turkic nationalist movements in Russia, Turkish governments have traditionally tried to 
approach this particular issue with reserve and caution. The political and economic chaos 
in the former Soviet Union should make Turkish reserve presently even more valuable for 
the integrity of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, Turkish ultranationalists and emigre 
groups of Turkic stock from the Russian Federation, who emigrated before and during the 
Soviet era, try with the help of a wide array of cultural activities to inform the Turkish 
public of the nationalist causes of their brethren in the Russian Federation. 
Thus, ethnic national challenges to the integrity of the Russian Federation seem 
poised to evolve in the near future into a major risk to international security and, by 
implication, to Turkish security, because Russia certainly would respond to such 
challenges with unrestrained fury rather than with complacence. In that eventuality, the 
current nuclear dispute between Russia and Ukraine would seem trivial compared to the 
myriad of daunting nuclear issues that would emerge then, given the complexities of the 
ethnic map of the Federation, and the location of the nuclear weapons sites and the 
relevant industrial infrastructure [26]. Proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear leakage, 
and hence nuclear terrorism and unauthorized use would be expected to occupy the top of 
the list of possible risks. 
Unsettled and Unsettling Relations Between Ukraine and Russia 
As previously discussed, Turks take a dim view of the future prospects of the full 
independence of the republics in the southern Caucasus. This region is viewed with a 
sense of urgency for one objective reason: It lies adjacent to Turkish borders. Irrespective 
of the affinity felt toward Azerbaijan (the Turkic republic closest to Turkey linguistically, 
culturally, and geographically) and the various geopolitical advantages Turkey 
presumably would derive from a close bilateral relationship with it, Turkish concerns 
over the future of the southern Caucasus surpasses its interest in Azerbaijan. These 
concerns begin above all else from a strategic preoccupation with Russian power and 
intentions. The possible full return of Russian power to this region and the parallel loss of 
the sovereignty and independence of the republics would be perceived as the "beginning 
of history" that many thought ended in 1991. This possible scenario would appear all the 
more risky for Turkish security if political and military power in Moscow rested in the 
hands of ultranationalist forces, and this basic psychology would hold with or without the 
physical presence of the nuclear weapons in the region. 
The interrelated questions of the future of Ukranian independence and the nature of 
Ukranian-Russian relations are of equal saliency to Turkish security, because of the basic 
law of physical proximity. In contrast to their rather cavalier attitude toward the 
independence of the southern Caucasus, the United States and Europe seem finally to 
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have concluded that Ukraine's independence constitutes one of the vital elements of 
European security in the post-<:old war era [27]. 
Ukraine's salience for Turkish security flows from two interconnected 
considerations: (1) Ukraine stands as a natural barrier against Russian expansionism and 
(2) Ukraine's various assets make it a valuable friend and potential partner in bilateral and 
multilateral cooperative schemes. Like that of the Russian Federation, Ukraine's role is 
seen as indispensable to the success of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, an 11-
member regional cooperative scheme with a focus on free trade, established in June 1992 
on the initiative of Turkey. The visit of Turkish President Demirel to Ukraine on May 31-
June 1, 1994, is indicative of the importance attached to the promotion of Turkish-
Ukrainian relations. 
Strains in Russian-Ukrainian relations over a host of issues (i.e., Ukrainian security, 
nuclear weapons, Crimea, the Russian minority, the Black Sea Fleet, and economic 
relations) do not lend much optimism to scenarios of a swift onset of stability and 
enduring peace in this part of the world. The problems besetting the Ukrainian economy 
in particular could severely undermine prospects for the resolution of bilateral issues in 
favor of Ukrainian positions. Ukraine is dependent on Russia's good will for economic 
relief. These scenarios could be reversed in favor of Moscow if a strongly pro-Russian 
government would hold power in Kiev. Newly elected President Leonid D. Kuchma may 
be expected to steer Ukraine in a collusion course with Moscow on most of the divisive 
issues, hopefully without compromising its independence. He is reported to have stressed 
that entering into an economic union with Russia, which he promised during his 
campaign, did not mean restoring Ukraine's Soviet-era links [28]. 
The dispute over Crimea has a special meaning for Turks and Turkey for historical, 
ethnic, and political reasons. The ancestors of present-day Crimean Tatars were part of 
the Ottoman Empire until 1783 when Tsarist Russia succeeded in driving the Turkish 
Empire from this strategic vantage point on the northern shores of the Black Sea. As in 
the case of the Volga Tatars, the Turkic ethnic makeup of the Crimean Tatars and the 
similarity in dialect of the Turkic language that both Tatais and Turks speak also create a 
sense of affinity. These sentimental elements are not allowed, however, to color the 
Turkish outlook on the future status of Crimea. Turkey believes that the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) principle of the inviolability of borders by 
force needs to be the general guide to dealing with cases of secessionism. (Incidentally, 
this line of argument serves the interests of Turkey's own problem with the PKK-led 
Kurdish separatist movement.) Thus, the argument goes, Crimea must remain Ukrainian. 
Ukraine's foreign minister reportedly has written to his Turkish counterpart to ask Turkey 
to lend support to possible measures by his republic to prevent secession by Crimea [29]. 
There is yet another aspect to the question of Crimea that attracts Turkish interest: 
the return of the Crimean Tatars deported from their homeland by Stalin in the aftermath 
of World War II. Tatars in Crimea today total about 300,000, a small minority compared 
to 1.5 million Russians and 600,000 Ukrainians. Turkish public opinion views the 
situation of the Crimean Tatars as an important moral and political issue. In his speech to 
the Rada during his official visit to Kiev last May, President Demirel referred to Crimean 
Tatars as "a bridge of friendship" between Turkey and Ukraine and expressed 
appreciation at Ukraine's efforts to facilitate the return of the deported Crimeans. 
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Turks are also in sympathy with the position of Ukraine in its insistence on security 
guarantees before yielding on the issue of nuclear weapons. The trilateral agreement of 
January 14, 1994, between the United States, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 
therefore has been greeted favorably and, in fact with relief, because of its prospective 
positive dual role in preventing proliferation and the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian 
dispute. 
Turks generally are not well informed about the internal dynamics of regional 
differences and cleavages that could possess divisive implications for the future integrity 
of Ukraine. If for example divisive forces are as powerful as they recently have been 
portrayed by some commentators [30], Turkish apprehensions about the future of 
Ukrainian independence would intensify. This would lead Turkey to reemphasize the 
need for increased Western economic assistance to Ukraine in an effort to help it initiate 
and implement major economic reforms. 
Turkey, however, is not in a position to influence the course of events. Turkish 
positions and preferences would have practically no weight in influencing the direction of 
the mutual perceptions and policies of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, least of all 
those of the Russian Federation. Domestic developments in each, and the attitudes of the 
United States and the European Union, are likely to be the determining elements in how 
the question of the Ukrainian-Russian dispute unfolds. 
Upheaval in the Balkans 
The post-Soviet Balkans on Turkey's northwest and west also have presented a new 
geopolitical space filled with conflicting movements and tendencies. While the collapse 
of communism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact 
have removed the combined ideological and military threat of over 4 decades, the region 
has fallen into deep political and military turmoil. The war in the former Yugoslavia in 
particular has and will essentially continue to destabilize the Balkans, because it has 
mobilized and further accentuated on a regionwide basis ethno-national, religious, and 
inter-state distinctions and rivalries that have deep historical roots in the collective Balkan 
psyche. 
The Balkans are Turkey's opening to Europe. Two and one-half million Turkish 
citizens reside in Western Europe, Turkey's number one trading partner. An important 
portion of Turkey's foreign and security policy throughout the cold war years was woven 
around ties with West European countries, surpassed only by its ties with the United 
States within the Atlantic Alliance. Today membership in the European Council, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the CSCE, and 
associate membership in the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union 
(EU), sustain its traditional ties to Western Europe. Thus, Turkey has high stakes in 
maintaining close and steady relations with Western Europe. One of the prerequisites of 
such a state of affairs is peace and stability in the Balkans. 
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina may continue to threaten regional peace and security 
·for many years because of the following reasons: (1) It has destroyed an independent 
republic duly recognized by the United Nations and the victims have suffered great 
human and material losses; (2) It has allowed the combined power of nationalism and 
military might to prevail; and (3) The most recent peace proposal from the contact group, 
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composed of the major powers, continues to reward aggression by dividing Bosnia-
Herzegovina and allowing Bosnian Serbs to retain a large portion of the territory they had 
captured by force. Paradoxically, the peace proposal has been rejected by Bosnian Serbs 
who want to retain an even larger portion of that territory. 
Other flashpoints (i.e., Kosovo and Macedonia), further confound regional politics 
and raise tensions. Turkey fears that the 27-month-old war of aggression in Bosnia-
Herzegovina has unsettled regional relationships and balances so deeply and mobilized 
regional suspicions so extensively that a wrong move by anyone could set in motion 
developments that could ignite a general, Balkan wide war. 
Against the background of war in the former Yugoslavia and a pervasive sense of 
insecurity, the absence of nuclear weapons states in the Balkans is a blessing. Turkish 
leaders do not anticipate nuclear proliferation in the Balkans in the foreseeable future, nor 
do they foresee a new nuclear weapons state in Europe unless the post-cold war security 
dynamics are radically overhauled under the impact of powerful new external and/or 
domestic pressures that could develop in the future. A nuclear-armed Germany, for 
example, would destroy not only a fundamental pillar of European security but that of 
global security as well [31]. Several arguments would seem to weaken a hypothetical case 
for proliferation by Germany. First and most critically, post-cold war Germany does not 
perceive a threat to its security, either from the East or the West. Second, Germany 
continues to be committed to the policy of security cooperation within the Western 
Alliance and security integration within Maastricht's Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). Finally, domestic politics and popular mood would not support or 
encourage German nuclear armament. Thus, Germany seems an unlikely candidate to go 
nuclear. 
In a Europe that is likely to retain the nuclear status quo among the major powers for 
at least as long as the politico-military status quo lasts, there would be little reason to 
expect smaller states in Central Europe and the Balkans to entertain nuclear ambitions. 
This argument is not meant to underestimate the seriousness of the insecurities among the 
smaller states, as well as the insecurity felt by the Visegrad states toward Russia [32]. Yet 
their chosen path to security has been to seek institutional cooperation with, and 
preferably membership in, the EU, NATO, and the WEU. No country in Central Europe 
and the Balkans would rationally want to risk its chances with these coveted institutions 
by even hinting at the contemplation of a nuclear option, nor are their economies in a 
position to sustain a hypothetical nuclear weapons program. 
The security dynamic between Greece and Turkey has been adversely touched by the 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the ensuing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
perception that the Balkan balance may be changing to their respective disadvantage has 
intensified mutual fears and rivalry. It is possible that this new level of mutual insecurity, 
which is likely to endure as long as the Balkans remain so deeply unstable and 
unpredictable, may have given reason to Greece, in particular, to consider the nuclear 
option. Why Greece rather than Turkey? (1) The combative Greek psyche has been 
mobilized by the Macedonian question; (2) Greece is frustrated with the way the EU is 
handling the Macedonian issue; (3) Greece has an overall sense of suddenly having been 
encircled in the post-cold war era by two new, potentially hostile neighbors (Albania and 
Macedonia) along its borders. What makes the new political map seem even more 
threatening in Greek eyes is the nature of relations between Albania and Macedonia, as 
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well as between Bosnian Muslims and Turkey, the perceived arch enemy. A nuclear 
capability may appear to be the only credible instrument to deter a hypothetical ring of 
hostility, presumably led by Turkey, from encroaching on Greek sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. 
It goes without saying that powerful countervailing forces operate against a 
hypothetical nuclear weapons course by Greece. Membership in the EU and the WEU is, 
theoretically, the best guarantee against the nuclear option. Greece also would have to 
have confidence that it would not be committing a grave strategic miscalculation, because 
a prospective nuclear weapons capability in Greece would certainly provide legitimacy to 
nuclear armament by Turkey, reproducing the existing conventional security dilemma in 
the nuclear sphere. 
It needs to be emphasized, however, that at this point of Balkan politics and Greek-
Turkish security dynamics, the scenarios above remain highly speculative. 
The Middle East 
While the dramatic change in the Arab-Israeli conflict from confrontation to the search 
for a negotiated resolution marks a whole new era for regional peace and stability, the 
Middle East/Persian Gulf region seems likely to remain faced with several fundamental 
challenges in the 1990s. Some of them will have direct implications for Turkey's political 
and security interests. 
The multiple sources of regional tension and instability in this part of the world tend 
to be viewed by the West through the lenses of its preoccupation with "Gulf security." 
Gulf security and stability are also of paramount importance for Turkey. Every serious 
hegemonial aspiration (e.g., Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in August 1990) is a challenge to 
Turkish security interests in the broadest sense. By siding with the anti-Saddam coalition 
in the second Persian Gulf war, Turkey demonstrated unequivocally that Turkish interests 
and positions on Persian Gulf security subsumed Western interests and positions. Turkey 
allowed United States aircraft to use NATO and Turkish air bases to launch air attacks on 
Iraq. While the crisis and the war highlighted Turkey's strategic location and importance 
as a Western ally, they cost Turkey $5.6 billion in revenues lost from trade with Iraq and 
tourism, and war-related expenditures, during 1990 and 1991, according to World Bank 
estimates. 
There are more specific Turkish interests and concerns as well, such as the 
pervasiveness of authoritarian regimes in the region, the unsettled nature of Iraq's role 
and status and its potential to press for regional hegemony again if and when international 
sanctions are lifted, the continuing vitality of the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, Islamic 
fundamentalism and radicalism and its proclivity to feed terror and train terrorists, Syrian 
irredentism over Lebanon, water scarcity and the resulting tensions over the 
transboundary water systems of the river Jordan and the Tigris and Euphrates, 
regionalization of the Kurdish question, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems. These issues have traditionally been interactive 
and intertwined. The second Persian Gulf war has reinforced the linkages among them, 
thereby enlarging the scope of their potential impact on regional stability and security. 
Key issues that link the other sources of insecurity mentioned above to create a 
highly insecure larger regional environment in the south for Turkey are regionalization of 
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the Kurdish question, tensions over the waters of the Euphrates, Islamic radicalism and 
fundamentalism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery 
systems. 
Regionalization of the Kurdish Question 
In the post-cold war and post-Persian Gulf War period, Turkish security has come under 
heavy pressure in the south above all else because what were traditional inter-state 
conflicts of interest between Turkey and its three southern neighbors (Syria, Iraq, and 
Iran), have been more forcefully interlocked with what essentially is an internal Turkish 
problem, the separatist armed struggle waged against it since 1984 by the PKK. This 
linkage perhaps was unavoidable as Iraq's defeat by the coalition forces and its continued 
isolation have created an extremely fluid political environment. The power balance, 
altered by the elimination of Iraq as a significant player for some time to come, has not 
been recreated in some other fashion conducive to long-term stability. This fluidity, 
together with the political geography and demography that characterize the region, have 
allowed Turkey's neighbors to exploit anti-Turkey Kurdish activities as a lever in their 
approach to contentious bilateral issues with Turkey. 
High-ranking Turkish officials have argued forcefully over the last several years that 
the Kurdish separatist armed struggle led by the Marxist-oriented PKK has found 
sanctuary in, and worse still, been assisted by Iran, Syria, and post-Gulf Persian War Iraq. 
These officials have paid visits to Teheran and Damascus to secure the two capitals' 
cooperation in arresting the sources of the PKK's strength in their respective countries. In 
the wake of a new round of PKK ambushes on civilian targets in the southeast in late 
October 1993, Turkish Prime Minister <;iller dispatched her special envoy to Syria, 
calling on "Turkey's neighbors to show whether they are friends of Turkey or not by 
taking all measures necessary against the PKK's use of their territories as sanctuary, 
training ground and source of weapons" [33]. Cooperation on mutual internal security 
matters was among the issues on the immediate agenda during an official visit to Teheran 
by President Demirel during July 1994. 
The Kurdish question also has become internationalized, adversely affecting 
Turkey's relations with its allies. The United States and Germany in particular have 
incorporated a substantial human rights dimension concerning Turkish Kurds in their 
overall approach to relations with Turkey. The protection of Iraqi-Kurdish autonomy in 
northern Iraq by coalition forces stationed at the Incirlik Airbase at Adana and the United 
Nations embargo on Iraq also have contributed to tensions in U.S.-Turkish relations, 
largely because of their high political, economic, and social burdens on Turkey. Turkey 
has lost annual revenues of about $250-300 million from the oil pipeline that pumped 
Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, in addition to several billion dollars in bilateral trade with 
Iraq lost due to the UN embargo. These losses have contributed to high rates of 
unemployment in southeastern Turkey, where social tension and political violence have 
escalated dramatically since the end of the Persian Gulf War. This deteriorating social 
and economic context has provided a fertile ground to the cause of the PKK. 
The question of the future status of Iraq is therefore of utmost relevance to Turkish 
interests in terms of the stability of its democratic regime, economic well-being, foreign 
relations, and even territorial integrity. The international community's failure to bring 
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about a democratic Iraq has significantly undermined Turkish domestic and foreign 
policy interests. On the other hand, the entire region would likely be thrown into greater 
dislocation in the event of the fragmentation of Iraq. 
Water Dispute over the Euphrates 
Both Iraq and Syria are believed to support the PKK in retaliation for losses they have 
suffered in the amount of the waters of the Euphrates available to them after January 
1990, when Turkey's huge new Atatiirk Dam, not far from the Turkish-Syrian border, 
began drawing water from the Euphrates. Turkey is the upstream country for the Tigris 
and Euphrates river systems. It has continued to honor a pledge made in 1987 to release a 
minimum of 500 cubic meters of water per second from the point where the Euphrates 
crosses the Turkish-Syrian border. Turkey has reassured the two countries that it will not 
manipulate the water situation as a political weapon; however, both Iraq and Syria have 
insisted on an agreement based on their terms, which essentially foresees the return of the 
pre-1990 de facto regime based on unobstructed flow of the river's waters into Syria, or, 
failing that, the apportionment of the waters among the riparians. Saddam Hussein sent 
warning signals to Turkey in spring 1990 to intimidate Turkey into restoring the status 
quo ante. 
Post-Persian Gulf War Iraq has an additional grievance against Turkey (i.e., the 
active Turkish contribution to the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq). Though Syria has lost 
Iraq as an ally in the struggle against Turkey on the water issue, it is in a position to harm 
Turkish interests by indirect means in peacetime. As mentioned above, the Turkish 
security establishment is seemingly convinced that the PKK would not survive without 
tacit but extensive Syrian support; the state of Turkish-Iranian relations on the subject is 
not much different. 
What is significant about these political tensions in Turkey's relations with its 
southern neighbors is the fact that they have been taking place in the context of a major 
effort by each of them to acquire weapons of mass destruction, possibly including a 
qualitatively different nuclear weapons capability, as mentioned below. 
Islamic Fundamentalism and Radicalism 
Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism is a potential threat that goes to the very heart of 
Turkey's domestic sociopolitical order. Ever since Ayatollah Khomeni's revolution took 
hold in Iran in 1979, Turkey has been apprehensive about Iran's declared goal of 
exporting the revolution to other Moslem countries. Iranian foreign policy has acquired 
greater pragmatism under President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Yet the power of 
domestic fundamentalists and Islamic radical forces in Turkey has been strengthened 
under the impact of both regional and domestic developments. At a minimum, the 
regional developments are generally believed to have been controlled by Teheran. 
Notwithstanding Turkish concerns about Iran's support of the PKK-led separatist 
armed struggle, its possible role in the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism 
in Turkey, its ambitious armaments programs, and the implicit rivalry for influence in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, the history of Turkey's relations with Iran under the Pahlavis 
was one of friendship and close cooperation. The positive legacy of that period, the need 
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for prudence in a highly volatile region, and a shared suspicion of Russian intentions in 
the near abroad probably will encourage the leaders of both countries to attempt to 
preserve dialogue in order to limit damage to their higher national interests. Iran, too, has 
security concerns about Turkey, the most important of which is Turkey's alliance with the 
United States and its membership in NATO. 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is, to put it simply, an 
extremely scary thought for most informed Turks. On the other hand, the sense of alarm 
and urgency about the possibility of proliferation is not overwhelming-not yet. The 
Turkish political elite argues that Iraq's nuclear weapons program has been destroyed so 
extensively as to have eliminated Iraq's chances of fully and dangerously recovering the 
program for long into the future. At the same time, however, they contend that Iraq's 
permanent incapacitation will be a fact of life only if the United Nations sanctions and 
inspections remain in force. The political elite further argues that lessons learned from the 
clandestine path to "the ultimate weapon" that Iraq had pursued without detection by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have impelled especially the United States 
and the IAEA to emphasize early detection, and hence prevention, of suspicious activities 
that would make it physically impossible to reach higher stages on the road to "the 
bomb." They point to a powerful precedent in support of this hypothesis. The U.S. and 
IAEA confrontation with North Korea over the latter's nuclear program (which both have 
suspected of including a covert weapons program) supports the view that potential 
proliferators in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region would not be tolerated by these 
actors. These, by the way, are not just any two actors in international politics: The former 
is the only remaining superpower and the latter is the leading watchdog of the 
international nonproliferation regime. 
Israel's possession of nuclear weapons has not caused serious concerns in Turkey as a 
source of threat to Turkish security interests. Rather, it has been viewed with 
apprehension because of the rationalization it has provided to Israel's adversaries to 
attempt to go nuclear. Most Turks believe that part of the reason behind Iraq's pre-
Persian Gulf War nuclear weapons program was, as Iran's current alleged efforts to 
fashion one is, the desire to create a deterrence capability against the Israeli nuclear force. 
The other and equally troubling motive force was regional hegemony. 
Whatever the real balance between these two motives, Turkey would be made very 
insecure by the possession of nuclear weapons by any actor in the Middle East in addition 
to Israel, especially by its neighbors in the south and east. Nuclear weapons would 
become a real source of threat when placed in the hands of undemocratic and 
irresponsible regimes. Turkey's neighbors in the south are certainly undemocratic, often 
demonstrating risky and irresponsible behavior as well. 
A nuclear-powered Iraq would be in a position to dictate its preferred solution to, 
above all else, the water dispute. A nuclear-powered Iran would be in a position to claim 
leadership of the Islamic world, and to exercise increased influence on Turkish domestic 
politics to the detriment of Turkey's Western-type secular democratic regime and 
Western-oriented foreign policy. In both cases, the greater danger would be the challenge 
these countries would pose to Persian Gulf security and hence to international security. A 
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potential nuclear weapons capability in the hands of either Iraq or Iran would translate to 
Iranian or Iraqi control over the Persian Gulf, and hence over the free flow of oil to the 
industrialized countries of the West 
Statements by various U.S. agencies, and academic studies and media reports about 
Iran's involvement in developing nuclear weapons bring the message to Turks that while 
the Iraqi nuclear menace largely has been eliminated, as long as the United Nations 
maintains its controls, Iran looks like a potential proliferator. There is, however, no 
conclusive evidence in support of this view [34]. As previously discussed, Iran's nuclear 
weapons prospects may seem limited, though not absent, given the new sense of alarm 
and mood of vigilance with which the remaining superpower and the IAEA have been 
chasing the issue [35]. In any case, various tools at the disposal of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime are expected to be further stiffened. Moreover the potential 
primary target, Israel, is not expected to sit back and watch Iran successfully develop the 
bomb [36]. 
From a short-term perspective it is the proliferation of other weapons of mass 
destruction (i.e., chemical and biological weapons, and tactical ballistic missiles [TBMs], 
that poses potential military risks to Turkish security. During the Persian Gulf War, 
Turkey faced the stark reality that it lacked defenses against both chemical weapons and 
TBMs. When Turkey allowed the United States to strike at Iraqi targets from Turkish 
territory during the war, two Patriot interceptor missiles were temporarily deployed near 
the Turkish-Iraqi border against possible retaliation by Iraqi Scuds, which did not come. 
Turkey seemingly shunned the TBM option in the 1980s, when its southern neighbors 
were ambitiously pursuing it, in order to discourage missile proliferation in the Balkans. 
Apparently it was calculated that Turkish procurement of TBM systems could fuel a 
qualitatively new arms race in southeastern Europe. Turkey chose instead to modernize 
its air defense force through plans for the procurement of 240 F-16s by the year 2000, of 
which 150 have already been coproduced in Turkey. 
What makes Middle East armaments programs especially risky is the fact that no 
arms control agreements and confidence-and-security-building regimes (CSBMs) bind 
the actors to a system of restraints and constraints. In contrast, Turkey is party to the CFE 
Treaty and the CSCE-mandated CSBMs. Turkey has kept its southeastern region, that 
borders Syria, Iraq, and Iran, outside the zone of application of both instruments in order 
to be able to respond to the regional context in its south and east. 
This article has thus far described and analyzed Turkish perceptions concerning the 
evolving security environment in the post-cold war era, with special attention to issues 
raised by nuclear weapons and their possible proliferation. Dominant themes and 
considerations in Turkish security thinking almost 5 years after the end of the cold war 
and 3 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union can be summarized as follows: fear of 
the restoration of imperial Russian borders, a scenario that would be especially alarming 
if ultranationalist domestic forces came into power in Moscow; concern that Russia could 
use its nuclear arsenal to cajole and intimidate Turkey into retreating from the foreign 
policy objective of establishing close political, economic, and cultural relations with the 
newly independent states in the southern Caucasus and Central Asia; apprehension that 
the instabilities and challenges generated by the protracted conflicts in the southern 
Caucasus and the Balkans may evolve into regional war; deep concern that regional and 
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international security would be severely undermined in the event that the international 
nonproliferation regime failed to prevent potential proliferators in the Middle East (e.g., 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt) from covertly pursuing "the weapon"; fear that the protracted 
regional conflicts that have been taking place in Turkey's neighborhood (i.e., secessionist 
struggles in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan on Turkey's east, and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia on Turkey's west), 
could evolve into larger wars with the participation of regional powers, drawing Turkey 
into their orbit if vital Turkish interests were put at risk. 
The nature and direction of actual and plausible Turkish attitudes and policies toward 
the perceived threat of nuclear weapons and their proliferation in countries and regions 
that lie on or close to Turkish borders will be presented below. 
Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation 
Would Turkey Go Nuclear? 
Turkey is party to the NPT and the IAEA and supports extension of the NPT at the 
forthcoming conference in April1995. It does not possess the civilian nuclear technology 
or the materials that would make it theoretically possible for it to pursue a covert 
weapons program, even if it chose to do so. The Turkish Atomic Energy Agency operates 
two nuclear research centers, one near Istanbul at <;ekmece and one in Ankara. The 
<;ekmece center is equipped with a 1 MW research reactor, now 33 years old. 
Turkey's unquestioning adherence to a non-nuclear weapons status was 
understandable in the context of the cold war when extended deterrence by the United 
States within the NATO framework was perceived to provide credible protection to the 
country. In retrospect, the absence of a firm commitment to development of civilian 
nuclear energy is less understandable given the extent of its early promotion and 
development in its neighbors (Iran, Iraq, and the former Warsaw Pact states of Bulgaria 
and the Soviet republic of Armenia). 
Today when deep geostrategic changes in the world balance of force have doomed to 
irrelevance fundamental security considerations and calculations of the cold war era held 
by the world's leading states and their allies, Turkey sustains its unqualified commitment 
to non-nuclear weapons status. In a very real sense, it does not have another option. 
Mainstream opinion seems to be in agreement with this choice and objective, meaning 
that Turkey views its security needs in the post-cold war era along basically the pattern 
of the past 40 years: reliance on U.S. and NATO alliances for deterrence and on Turkish 
conventional forces for defense. The difference today lies in the degree of significance 
attached to these two traditional elements of Turkish security. The post-cold war security 
environment has led Turkey to press for a conventional force much stronger, especially in 
defensive capability, than the one it possessed during the cold war. This thinking explains 
the extensive modernization program that the Turkish armed forces have been engaged in 
since the late 1980s. On the credibility of U.S. and NATO deterrence for Turkish 
security, assessments differ, however, and are discussed below. 
The Turkish commitment to non-nuclear weapons status is coupled with several 
strong qualifiers simply because Turkey needs to be reassured that it would be protected 
against proliferation if and when it did indeed occur. First, the nonproliferation regime 
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must not merely be maintained but it must be firmly and resolutely strengthened in its 
multidimensional aspects and layers in order to prevent proliferation through covert 
programs and clandestine operations that would support those programs. It seems 
absolutely essential that verification and safeguards, in particular, must be made highly 
intrusive and stringent. Second, the strategic balance between the United States and 
NATO and the Russian Federation must not be allowed to erode, by the former's 
unilateral moves to the disadvantage of NATO, until Russia gives sustained evidence that 
it has devalued the role of nuclear weapons in its overall foreign policy, including its 
policy toward the near abroad and their neighbors rather than merely in its Western 
policy. Third, the United States and NATO must desist from behavior that would raise 
suspicions in the minds of Russia and the potential proliferators in surrounding regions 
about the former's genuine commitment to the security of Turkey. In other words, the 
extended deterrence of the United States must remain convincing and credible to Turks as 
well as to de facto and de jure nuclear weapons states and potential proliferators. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly in view of the positive changes in U.S.-Russian and 
NATO-Russian relations that have transformed NATO's political philosophy and military 
thinking and strategy, many in the Turkish official establishment continue believe that 
Turkish security cannot and should not be conceived of in isolation of NATO. They 
believe that Turkey is protected against intimidation (which does not seem unlikely) and 
attack (which seems highly unlikely) by an aggressor, be it a nuclear weapons state or 
not. On the other hand, there certainly is a minority view that believes U.S. and NATO 
deterrence in the post-cold war era has lost its meaning, especially now that Russia has 
joined the Partnership for Peace. The practical implications for Turkish security policy of 
this difference of opinion with respect to NATO credibility seem to be near zero. Both 
groups press for a greatly strengthened conventional force, as previously discussed, and 
rule out a hypothetical nuclear weapons option. 
Given Turkey's nonrecord on civilian nuclear energy until today, Turkish support for 
the international nonproliferation regime codified in the NPT and the IAEA statutes faces 
the risk of being interpreted as an implicit agreement with the discrimination built into 
these instruments between the nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." On the contrary, Turkey's 
firm stand against nuclear weapons proliferation should not be confused as a theoretical 
stand against civilian nuclear energy. Turkey would need to keep its options open for 
large-scale exploitation of civilian nuclear energy in the future. Its long-term interests, 
then, dictate that it share some of the principal concerns of the leading Third World states 
on the question of the discriminatory nature of the NPT, an issue likely to generate a 
highly divisive and disruptive debate at the NPT extension conference in April 1995. 
The Islamic fundamentalists, whose power has been on the rise during the past 
decade, may be the only major political force whose ideology would inherently question 
Turkey's unqualified commitment to nonnuclear weapons status. The Welfare Party, 
which is the leading fundamentalist political party, rejects the pro-Western foundation of 
Turkish foreign and security policies because of its ideological opposition to the West 
[37]. According to the lslamists, Turkey must fear not only the Russian nuclear arsenal 
but equally that of the United States whose very military presence in Turkey is intended 
to cut the latter off from closer bonding with the Moslem world. Thus, they argue that 
Turkish security thinking and planning need to be restructured on the basis of decoupling 
from the United States and NATO and toward security relationships with the Moslem 
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countries. The Welfare Party refrains from being explicit about which model among the 
Moslem countries it plans to closely work with when in power: an anti-Western Iran, pro-
Western Saudi Arabia, or anti-Western but secular Libya? It is also equally discreet about 
the potential role it envisages for nuclear weapons in Turkey's security policy. One could 
safely guess, however, that the Welfare Party's thinking about an "Islamic bomb" would 
not differ fundamentally from that of others in the Islamic world who cherish it as a 
symbol of prestige and power in the context of their ideological struggle with the West. 
Finally, it is important to be reminded that Turkey takes the threat of the existence 
and proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction in its neighborhood as seriously as 
the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Arms control agreements and supply-side 
controls, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR), are seen respectively as important steps in the right direction. 
Many are skeptical, however, about the difficulties that lie ahead in the implementation of 
the complicated CWC once it goes into force, and of the effectiveness of the MTCR as 
long as important supplier countries remain outside. 
Conclusion 
The post-cold war era confronts Turkish security with a series of potential risks and 
threats not common to the cold war era. Regional tensions, rivalries, and armed conflicts, 
fueled especially by extreme ethnic nationalism, hegemonial and/or imperial aspirations 
and moves, and the potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction, stand out as the leading risks and potential threats to Turkish security. 
The focal point of Turkish attitudes and policies toward these sources of potential 
threats have been, and seem most likely to continue to be, centered on the utilization of 
bilateral and multilateral tools of diplomacy. As a parallel measure, the Turkish armed 
forces is undergoing major reorganization and modernization to improve Turkey's 
conventional deterrence and defense capability. There is no public debate or considered 
judgment among the official and unofficial Turkish political elite about the wisdom and 
merits of going nuclear. 
The Turkish political elite's image of Turkey as a law-abiding, stable, and reliable 
member of the international society and an ally of the West seems, by definition, to 
exclude a serious consideration by Turkey of risky and adventurous choices and 
objectives such as the nuclear weapons option. Moreover, they are keenly aware of the 
technological constraints that would have to be overcome and the economic sacrifices 
that would have to be endured if such a choice were made. The task of preventing 
proliferation therefore falls on the shoulders of the major powers and the nonproliferation 
regime (a much reformed one from here on) they have erected. Turkey does entertain 
serious and legitimate views that the risk of proliferation is real and that the risk would 
transform into a clear danger unless the custodians of international security and the 
nonproliferation regime were extremely serious about it. On the other hand, this 
seriousness of purpose must not be allowed to discriminate against the have-nots who 
need to rely on peaceful nuclear energy for sustained growth-a point on which most 
informed Turks are in agreement with the Third World. 
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